Each country produces just one good, corn, by means of corn, labour and land. Capitalists allocate
their funds between corn production and the purchase of land so as to equalise the rate of profit
on these activities under equilibrium expectations. Autarky in natural equilibrium is briefly discussed.
Opening the economy allows capitalists to invest either domestically or abroad. In the small
country case, equilibrium expectations make the economy very unstable. Under most circumstances,
the economy will register an inflow of capital, which can be employed productively only in the
short run, if at all, and thereafter will translate in speculation in land, followed by a balance of payments
crisis and collapse on this market.
Nell’articolo si propone una visione della cooperazione pluralistica e multidimensionale. In particolare, si cerca di mostrare come, sotto determinate condizioni, forme meno incondizionali di cooperazione si possono combinare con forme piu` gratuite. Partendo dal Dilemma del Prigioniero, si analizza l’evoluzione della cooperazione in presenza di diverse strategie, non tutte basate sull’ipotesi di self-interest e di condizionalità, che rappresentano l’eterogeneità delle forme della cooperazione nella vita civile. Le dinamiche di cooperazione sono studiate attraverso l’utilizzo di giochi evolutivi, sia in un contesto one-shot, sia di giochi ripetuti. Uno dei risultati di rilievo del modello è che la cooperazione è favorita dall’eterogeneità delle strategie.
I develop a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth with realistic features of the market for
innovations as decreasing marginal productivity at the firm level and the possibility of wasteful duplications
of resources between firms due to congestion at the industry level. Moreover, I consider
the possibility that incumbent patentholders have a competitive advantage in the patent races for the
next generation technologies and hence endogenously invest in R&D: in this case the value of being
a leader is higher and growth driven by market leaders is higher. Technically the paper provides a
complete analytical solution of the general equilibrium model with endogenous persistence of leadership
through dynamic programming techniques and undetermined coefficient methods. Moreover,
this framework can be used for other macroeconomic investigations: I show that other sources of
growth may reduce investment inducing a paradoxical negative correlation between growth and
R&D spending, and that price stickiness induces an inverted U relation between inflation and long
This paper discusses non-exponential growth patterns of macroeconomic models. More specifically, the paper discusses asymptotic growth patterns of the numbers of clusters and of components of partition vectors, that is, the number of clusters of specific sizes, of one- and two-parameter Poisson- Dirichlet models as the model sizes grow towards infinity. As the model sizes become large, the coefficients of variaation of the cluster sizes and components of the partition vector tend to zero in one-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet model, but they remain positive in the two-parameter version. Furthermore, the two-parameter version of the model exhibits power-law behavior, while the oneparameter version does not. The growth behavior of the two-parameter models is shown to be expressed in terms of generalized Mittag-Leffler distributions. The paper ends with preliminary discussion of the effects of demand pattern management policies on growth patterns of models that endogenize the parameters of the two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet model.
The main goal of this essay is to outline the fundamental theses of Milton Friedman about the
distribution of all goods. The ethical principles supporting and justifying the Friedman’s positions are
enucleated, and some theoretical and practical difficulties in terms of justice inherent in his conceptions
are set in evidence. I.e. the difficulties in particular inherent to a model of society and economics
founded on freedom in the widest sense, of all actors and agents, and substantially of all citizens.