Sergio Destefanis

Author's titles

Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does CorporatismMatter? digital

by Sergio Destefanis, Maria Olivella Rizza

Year: 2007

In this paper we test the hypothesis that central bank independence is closely correlated to social agreement about decisions on income distribution. Using data from a panel of OECD countries over the period 1972-2002 and controlling for several macroeconomic factors, we find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. When some indexes of corporatism are used to allow for the degree of social agreement on income distribution and its determination, the relationship between inflation and CBI weakens considerably. This evidence is consistent with the mechanism posited in Pittaluga - Cama (2004) according to which society formally endows the central bank with independence in order to safeguard a key principle of democracy, namely that decision-makers should be clearly responsible for their choices and actions.

€ 6.00

Wages and Monetary Policy in Italy Before and After the Wage Agreements digital

by Sergio Destefanis, Giuseppe Mastromatteo, Giovanni Verga

Year: 2005

We examine the influence of the 1992 and 1993 wage agreements on the disinflation experienced in Italy through the 1990s, providing econometric estimates both for the reaction function of the Bank of Italy and for 2-digit industry wage equations. We rely on industry-level measures for the degree of indexation, and find that, after the agreements, wage setters became more forward-looking and expectations were to some extent influenced by the target rate of inflation. The relationships between wages and the other main labour market variables were not much affected by the agreements.

€ 6.00