Maria Olivella Rizza

Author's titles

Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does CorporatismMatter? digital

by Sergio Destefanis, Maria Olivella Rizza

Year: 2007

In this paper we test the hypothesis that central bank independence is closely correlated to social agreement about decisions on income distribution. Using data from a panel of OECD countries over the period 1972-2002 and controlling for several macroeconomic factors, we find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. When some indexes of corporatism are used to allow for the degree of social agreement on income distribution and its determination, the relationship between inflation and CBI weakens considerably. This evidence is consistent with the mechanism posited in Pittaluga - Cama (2004) according to which society formally endows the central bank with independence in order to safeguard a key principle of democracy, namely that decision-makers should be clearly responsible for their choices and actions.

€ 6.00

Indipendenza della Banca Centrale e democrazia: una contraddizione apparente digital

by Maria Olivella Rizza

Year: 2004

Since Rogoff theorised it, central bank independence has been analysed almost exclusively with the tools of economic science, leading some economists to highlight a contradiction between independence and democracy. Recent contributions introducing political science tools have proposed a rationalisation of monetary conduct in which this contradiction does not hold. This article examines the contributions to the debate of Blinder, Stiglitz and Cama e Pittaluga, whose implicit positions on the neutrality of monetary policy are made explicit. It shows that Central Bank independence can be endorced even if neutrality is not agreed and suggests that independence is to be ascribed in different forms and degrees.

€ 6.00