Indipendenza della Banca Centrale e democrazia: una contraddizione apparente

Name: Indipendenza della Banca Centrale e democrazia: una contraddizione apparente
Brand: Vita e Pensiero
Price: 6.00 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

digital

Article

Magazine

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI

Issue

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2004 - 3

Title

Indipendenza della Banca Centrale e democrazia: una contraddizione apparente

Author

Maria Olivella Rizza

Publisher

Vita e Pensiero

Format

Article |

Pdf

Pages

Online from

09-2017

Issn

0035-676X (print) | 1827-7918 (digital)

€ 6.00

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Description

Since Rogoff theorised it, central bank independence has been analysed almost exclusively with the tools of economic science, leading some economists to highlight a contradiction between independence and democracy. Recent contributions introducing political science tools have proposed a rationalisation of monetary conduct in which this contradiction does not hold. This article examines the contributions to the debate of Blinder, Stiglitz and Cama e Pittaluga, whose implicit positions on the neutrality of monetary policy are made explicit. It shows that Central Bank independence can be endorced even if neutrality is not agreed and suggests that independence is to be ascribed in different forms and degrees.