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Wage Regulation and Performance-Related Pay in Italian Public Sector

digital Wage Regulation and Performance-Related Pay
in Italian Public Sector
Article
journal RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI
section Open Access
title Wage Regulation and Performance-Related Pay in Italian Public Sector
author
publisher Vita e Pensiero
format Article | Pdf
online since 06-2020
doi 10.26350/000518_000045
issn 0035-676X (print) | 1827-7918 (digital)
Free

Ebook format Pdf readable on these devices:

Attempts to reform the Italian civil service in the last 30 years have been mainly done mimicking private sector practices. The results have been quite disappointing. Useful hints can be obtained from a principal-agent model, with regard to the difficulty of measuring output and – even more – outcome. More convincing is an alternative collusive equilibrium model, which clarifies the distance between private and public employers. Useful indications for the future can be drawn from these failures.

keywords

Performance-related, Collusive equilibrium, New public management.

Author biography

REF Ricerche, Milan. Email: cvignocchi@refricerche.it.