History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?
|
digital
Article
€ 6.00
|
Article |
Ebook format Pdf readable on these devices:
|
|
|
|
|
In an intertemporal Arrow-Debreu economy with a continuum of agents, suppose that the auctioneer
sets prices while the government institutes optimal lump-sum transfers period by period. An
earlier paper showed how subgame imperfections arise because agents understand how their current
decisions such as those determining investment will influence future lump-sum transfers. This observation
undermines the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics and makes «history» a widespread
externality. A two-period model is used to investigate the constrained efficiency properties of
different kinds of equilibrium. Possibilities for remedial policy are also discussed.
|
Browse the archive
Recent issues
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2022 - 3
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2022 - 2. A Special Issue on “Economics of Disability”
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2022 - 1
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2022 - 2. A Special Issue on “Economics of Disability”
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2022 - 1
Available online
20222021202020192018201720162015201420132012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000199919981997199619951994199319921991199019891988198719861985198419831982198119801979197819771976197519741973197219711970196919681967196619651964196319621961196019591958195719561955195419531952195119501949194819471946194219411940193919381937193619351934
