Regulation of Banks: Moving Targets
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We investigate, in a model of perfectly competitive banks and a lower bound on the deposit rate
that these banks may offer, the idea that, as a result of financial innovation, capital adequacy requirements
may become ineffective in preventing banks from investing in risky assets which are,
from the point of view of society, inefficient. We interpret this as one possible explanation of the
seemingly repeated failure of the Basel accords to induce a desired level of prudence by the
banks.
Keywords: Bank regulation, capital requirements, moral hazard, financial innovation. JEL Classification: D43, D82, G21, G28. |
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